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INTRODUCTION
Governments should not own mineral rights simply in order to collect revenue, nor should they assume 
rents to justify super taxes. The fact remains that most governments do collect additional revenues 
from mining operations. Using a standard text book economic analysis, two different categories of 
revenue collection instruments are discussed. First, however, the concept property rights and how 
they apply to minerals is briefl y covered. The two cases of mineral taxation, royalties and income 
taxes, are illustrated using a constant cost example for gold mining operations. Both systems have 
major faults. Royalties are regressive and shorten the life-of-mine. Income taxes, including a super 
tax, may create under-investment in the mining industry if there are no rents present. Finally, using 
the same constant cost model the proposed Australian resource super profi ts tax (RSPT) is analysed. 
The purpose of this paper is not to provide an in depth economic analysis, but rather to highlight 
the major conclusions it would produce. The concepts used in this paper can be found in most 
good microeconomics text books, which usually provide references to classical and contemporary 
contributions. The application to mining taxation systems is, however, the work of the authors. 
Varian (1992) remains a standard text for microeconomic analysis. For a more specialised treatment 
on property rights and taxation systems, Cullis and Jones (1992) and Perman, Ma and McGilvray 
(1996) are good starting points. Many excellent books on modern fi nancial and investment analysis 
exist, however, Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) is the most accessible.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The ability to trade private property is the fundamental characteristic of modern economies, but 
trade is only possible if individuals have exclusive rights to that property. In other words, the 
protection of private property, in conjunction with well functioning markets, will generate effi cient 
prices. Effi cient prices should ensure an effi cient allocation of resources, particularly in capital 
markets, among competing uses. This caricature of a private market economy only exists if markets 
are competitive and private property rights can easily be assigned. 
Sometimes it is impossible or very diffi cult to exclude people from the benefi ts fl owing from certain 
property. For example, the incentive for private fi rms to build public parks (assuming that they cannot 
charge user fees) is very low resulting in too few parks open to the public. These type of goods and 
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ABSTRACT 
In a modern economy there is a compelling case why governments should not own property rights 
to mineral deposits. Assuming they do, however, governments will use these constitution rights to 
raise revenue. They have two basic instruments to achieve this; a royalty charge on price or a rent 
tax on income/profi ts. On the one hand, a royalty charge creates a ‘deadweight loss’ to society by 
increasing cut-off grades and decreasing the life-of-mine. They are also regressive. However, they are 
easy to administer. On the other hand, a rent tax avoids the problem of ‘deadweight loss’; it does not 
impact on the life-of-mine because the tax structure is neutral. But, they are diffi cult to administer 
correctly, particularly in the determination of rents and the defi nition of mining per se. If rents are 
incorrectly determined capital markets are distorted. And, if mining activities are incorrectly defi ned, 
downstream activities could be adversely affected. 
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services are called public goods and there is a case for government to provide them through taxable 
income. If congestion is possible then a user fee is applicable. In some instances the government will 
attempt to mimic private property rights in order to capture the effi ciencies inherent in the market 
system. A good example of this is the establishment of tradable carbon emission permits.
The government only has a case for owning mineral property if the deposits display public good 
characteristics. If the government believes that the market for mineral deposits functions badly, then 
it should regulate rather than nationalise. The entire process of mining, from prospecting to closure, 
displays very strong private good characteristics. There might be some justifi cation for government 
to control property rights on mineral deposits if they subject to monopoly markets, which is generally 
not the case. The government does have a role to play in the registration and protection of private 
property rights to mineral deposits – which it does.
Most governments around the world still hold exclusive rights to mineral property, although few 
exercise the full extent of their rights. What is obvious is that governments use these rights to raise 
revenue over and above the normal company taxation. The concept of weak sustainability is often 
used to justify the additional taxation, that is, non-renewable capital (the mineral deposit) can be 
replaced by man-made capital (infrastructure) and government is better at providing infrastructure 
than private industry. In a world of public-private partnerships and private provision of public goods 
like water, electricity, roads and so on, the weak sustainability argument might not be as strong as it 
was 30 years ago.
ROYALTIES – AD VALOREM TAXES
Strictly speaking royalties are a proportion of the produce, or revenue, paid to the crown for the use 
of land. Problems arise when fertile land becomes scarce and people begin to farm marginal land 
which produces no excess (or rent). Mining/mineral royalties exhibit similar characteristics.
In the case of Western Australian Gold Royalty system, the mining company pays a proportion of 
the gold price as a royalty to the state government. Providing it is clear who pays the royalty, the 
system is easy to administer and police. The only information needed is gold output and the gold 
price to calculate the charge. This instrument is, however, far from benign. As is explained below; it 
is regressive, it increases the cut-off grade and it decreases the life-of-mine. As a result it creates a 
loss to society that cannot be recovered, a ‘deadweight loss’. 
A tax is termed regressive if it rises when a profi t, or income, falls. To illustrate the regressive nature 
of the gold royalty a simple constant cost example is presented on Figure 1. The analysis holds the 
cost of producing an ounce of gold constant at $900 and a royalty charge of 2.5 per cent on price. The 
price per ounce is allowed to vary from $900 to $1400 per ounce. When the gold price is, for example 
$1000 ounce, the royalty is 25 per cent of profi t. A further price increase to $1400 reduces the royalty 
to just seven per cent of profi t. In addition, if the company is making a loss but still produces gold it 
still has to pay the royalty - at a gold price of $800, and if the mine is still operating, it makes a loss 
of $100 per ounce, but still pays a $20 per ounce royalty.  
FIG 1 - The regressive gold royalty charge.
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At normal breakeven, where the gold price is at $900 per ounce (costs are held constant at $900), 
the mine still pays a royalty and makes a loss of $22.50. The breakeven after a royalty charge increases 
to just over $923 ounce. This represents a higher cut-off grade which will impact adversely on the 
life-of-mine. The impact can be measured using an aggregated grade/tonnage curve. The important 
issue is; under normal market conditions more of the resource will be exploited – the royalty creates 
an undesirable market imperfection. This market imperfection has a real impact on society; people 
are employed for shorter periods, total income fl ows from the mine are lower and downstream 
income and employment effects are not as strong or long lasting. These adverse consequences can 
be avoided by using an income/profi t based system implemented as a rent tax. This is discussed in 
the next section. 
RENTS – PROFIT BASED TAXES
A profi t based tax on economic rent certainly avoids the deadweight loss problems of a regressive 
royalty, but it introduces a different set of problems which make it diffi cult to administer effi ciently 
and effectively. First, a fl at rate tax is illustrated using the constant cost model. The total tax burden 
from company income taxes and gold royalties is also presented. Second, because government 
assumes that rents exist in mining, the concept is discussed from a modern economic perspective. 
The effect on the capital market resulting from taxing non-existent rents is highlighted. 
Profi t based tax
As the name suggests profi t based taxes place a charge on profi ts, that is, they take into account the 
cost structure of the fi rm. If the tax rate is constant it is called a fl at rate tax; Australian company 
tax is 30 per cent of profi ts regardless of the size of the company. Figure 2 illustrates a fl at 30 per 
cent company tax as percentage of profi ts. A progressive tax is one where the tax rate rises as income 
increases, as in personal income tax.
The advantage of a profi t based tax is that it does not impact on the breakeven point as no profi ts 
are made at this point and thus no tax is paid. If the tax does not impact on the breakeven point it 
does not impact on the cut-off grade or the life-of-mine.
Using the same constant cost assumptions, the current tax burden on gold mining companies 
comprises a 30 per cent income tax and a 2.5 per cent royalty charge on gold sales. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 shows that the total tax burden as a percentage of income is very high when the gold 
price is low. During times of low gold prices the gold mining companies pay an excessive tax. When 
prices increase the tax burden decreases exponentially. This phenomenon begs a serious review of 
the current system of gold royalties, particularly in designing an instrument that is not regressive 
and does not impact on cut-off grades. This is exactly what the Henry Resource Rent Tax is supposed 
to achieve. Central to the proposed tax, however, is the presence of resource rents. 
FIG 2 - The fl at rate company income tax.
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Resource rents
Modern economics defi nes ‘economic rent’ or ‘super-normal profi ts’ as profi ts over and above the 
normal expected return for the level of risk inherent a particular industry. In theory, if economic 
rents are present and if markets, particularly capital markets, work properly then new fi rms will enter 
the industry to capture the excess gain. As more new fi rms enter the industry the supply increases, 
which depresses price and excess profi ts are eroded down to normal profi ts. In other words, under 
competitive market conditions economic rents should not exist.
A good example of where rents do exist is when a company can take out copyright or patents on a 
product or service. These rights place a barrier to entry into the market, thus creating a monopoly 
situation. New fi rms cannot enter, keeping prices high. Excess profi ts are sustained. Thus in situations 
where excess profi ts exist, which must be due to market failure in some form, a good case can be 
made for a rent tax. Indeed, the Australian government acknowledges this point, but recognises that 
imposing a super profi ts tax on, for example software or pharmaceutical companies encourages them 
to move off-shore (KPMG, 2010, p 12).
The diffi cult part of instituting a rent tax is defi ning when the fi rm or industry begins to make super-
profi ts/rents. The classical theory of investments and fi nance asserts that people have a portfolio of 
investment choices. These investment choices range from options that offer a safe return to those 
that are very risky. Under the assumption that investors do not like risk, which is a good assumption, 
they will expect a higher return on risky projects than they would from a safe one. The price that 
investors are willing to pay to invest in a project will refl ect a return in line with the risk associated 
with that industry. If the return is higher than the associated industry risk then asset prices are bid 
up driving the return down. 
It follows that placing a super tax on an industry that operates under competitive capital markets, 
and has few barriers to entry, simply reduces profi ts to level below that for the industry risk profi le. 
In this case the asset price is bid down and people will be slow to invest in new projects because the 
new price would refl ect an industry with a lower risk profi le. If investors had a choice between buying 
assets in projects between two industries with similar prices but different risk profi les they would 
obviously choose the less risky option. A rent tax on an industry not making super-normal profi ts will 
result in under-investment in that industry. 
The big question still remains; do companies exploiting natural mineral resources make economic 
rents? The Australian government insists that they always do (KPMG, 2010, p 13) and because 
mineral deposits are immobile, unlike software companies, they are good candidates for a super 
profi ts tax. These issues are discussed in the next section. 
RESOURCE SUPER PROFITS TAX
As stated previously, the issues underlying the resource super profi ts tax (RSPT) are relatively 
straightforward: fi rst, the government insists that mining activities earn resource rents, which they 
FIG 3 - Total tax burden as a percentage of income for gold miners.
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describe also as super profi ts, and second, because mineral resources are immobile they are good 
candidates for a super tax. Thus a new RSPT was proposed in the Henry Tax Review. The structure 
of the RSPT is a payment of 40 per cent of profi ts over and above company income tax, but as a 
deductable item from company income tax. The RSPT slots in at any profi t level above the risk free 
interest rate (government bond). Justifi cation for these rates is given below.
The Australian government contends that any profi ts in the resource industry above the risk free 
interest rate can be treated as super profi t because:
  the RSPT allows for deductions of previous losses – 15 per cent for exploration and fi ve per cent 
for development, for the theory to work these should not be capped; and
  companies are allowed to ring-fence poorly performing mines with well performing ones.
In essence, this means that if full payment for deductions are allowed and all tax losses 
are paid out at project close, then the risk profi le should remain neutral (KPMG, 2010, 
pp 13 - 15). The 40 per cent super profi t rate is more arbitrary. The government makes it clear that 
it is not the rate that matters, but rather that it remains constant over a long period of time (KPMG, 
2010, pp 15 - 16).
A diagrammatic illustration, using the same constant cost example as previously, showing the 
difference between the RSPT and the gold royalty system is presented on Figure 4. The RSPT value 
includes the rule that it is deductable from company income tax. 
Figure 4 highlights some interesting points. Notably, that the RSPT is lower than the current 
taxation and royalty system for mines making marginal profi ts, or when the price of gold is depressed. 
Also, over a range of prices from about $920 per ounce to $1400 per ounce the net revenues (area 
beneath the curves) are greater for a royalty based system than for the RSPT. Two further issues on 
the RSPT are discussed below.
First, as stated on the government website dealing with the RSPT ‘Under the RSPT, fi rms will 
receive a refundable credit for royalties paid. That is, every dollar of royalties a fi rm pays will reduce 
the RSPT liability by a full dollar’ (Australian Government, 2010). With regard to this rule and 
Figure 4, it is worth looking at two interesting cases:
1. At high prices or when the mining fi rm is making good profi ts the royalty charge is refunded, 
but the difference between the revenue from the royalty charge and the RSPT is small (the area 
between the two curves after around $1100). Here there are few if any effi ciency gains from adding 
a new tax and then refunding most of it back.
2. If the mining company is not doing very well, or prices are low, royalty payments are greater than 
the RSPT and the system reverts back to the royalty structure.
Fundamentally, the proposed RSPT system captures marginally more revenue at high prices and 
from rich mines; otherwise there is little difference apart from the larger administrative costs to run 
the RSPT.
FIG 4 - Comparison between the resource super profi ts tax and gold royalties.
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Second, the ‘RSPT would not be applied to profi ts from downstream activities such as refi neries and 
smelters’ (KPMG, 2010, p 16). In gold mining, this means that only profi ts made from actual mining 
are subject to a super tax. Mining in this instance, unlike that defi ned in the Mining Act 1978, stops at 
the ROM; ore transport from the mine site, milling and processing are not subject to the RSPT. It is 
very unlikely that ore on a mining ROM pad is worth enough to qualify for super profi ts, if it makes a 
profi t at all. Most mining companies are vertically integrated and use unit costs, rather than transfer 
prices, to value the ore. For the proposed RSPT to be effective in gold mining, with an absence for a 
market price for the ore, standardised valuation techniques and methods are necessary. Failing this, 
it reverts back to the old regressive style of gold royalties.
CONCLUSIONS
In a complex modern economy there are no good reasons for governments to own mineral property 
rights. The only reason they do, is that it gives them an inalienable right to impose an additional charge 
on mining companies. This is often justifi ed by insisting that mining generates rents/economic profi t.
The collection of these so-called rents is often problematic. The two instruments discussed in the 
paper both have fatal fl aws. The royalty system is regressive, it lowers cut-off grade, decreases life-
of-mine and has a consequent negative impact on society. The income based super taxes pass on the 
grounds of not being regressive, but fundamentally fail because they assume the existence of rents 
in the exploitation of all mineral deposits. Imposing a super tax on an industry that is not making 
excess profi ts creates capital market disturbances and under-investment in that industry. When 
comparing the proposed resource super profi ts tax with the royalty system for gold mining, it fails on 
the grounds of being ineffective particularly if both systems run concurrently. 
Finally, it should be the onus of government to prove, not assume, the existence of rents before a 
super tax is imposed. Once this is proved then an appropriate tax structure can be designed. It is 
important to note that the government does not need to own mineral right to impose super taxes. 
State governments do have to own mineral rights to impose royalties. 
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